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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006 Judge Cheryl Aleman assigned attorney and member of the Florida
Sean Conway to represent an indigent client in a criminal proceeding.2 The
client was arraigned on October 18 and then on October 24 Conway received a
notice from the court clerk that the trial would begin on October 30.3 When Judge
Aleman asked Conway whether he wanted to begin trial or receive a continuance
in order to serve witnesses or engage in discovery, the judge insisted that the client
waive his right to a speedy trial.4 The client decided to waive that right.5 The next
day, on Halloween, Conway posted a blog entry on a website frequented by local
attorneys.6 In the entry, titled “Judge Aleman’s new (illegal) ‘One-week to prepare’
policy,” Conway criticized Aleman for pressuring defendants to waive their right
to a speedy trial in exchange for a continuance.7 Conway wrote that Aleman was
“clearly unfit for her position and knows not what it means to be a neutral
arbiter,” and he called her an “Evil, Unfair Witch.”8 In April 2007 the Florida Bar
began investigating Conway for his remarks.9 On November 27, 2007, a grievance
committee found probable cause for violations of numerous Florida Bar rules,10

Bar1

1.
In this Note, the term “bar,” unless otherwise indicated, refers to Black’s Law Dictionary
definition of a “state bar association”: “State bar associations are usu[ally] created by statute, and
membership is often mandatory for those who practice law in the state. Unlike voluntary,
professional-development bar associations such as the American Bar Association, state bar
associations often have the authority to regulate the legal profession, by undertaking such matters as
disciplining attorneys and bringing lawsuits against those who engage in the unauthorized practice of
law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (9th ed. 2009).
2. Respondent Sean William Conway’s Response to this Court’s Rule to Show Cause Order at
1, Florida Bar v. Conway, No. SC08-326 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://jaablog.jaablaw.com
/files/34726-32374/conway_response.pdf.
3. Id. at 1–2.
4. Id. at 2–3.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Letter from Alan Anthony Pascal, Bar Counsel to the Florida Bar, to Sean Conway (Apr. 3,
2007), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2007-04-03-letter%20
notifying%20conway%20of%20bar%20investigation.pdf (informing Conway that the bar was
investigating him for his statements about Judge Aleman).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10.
Notice of Finding of Probable Cause for Further Disciplinary Proceedings at 9–10,
Florida Bar v. Conway, No. SC08-326 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://
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including Rules 4-8.2 and 4-8.4, which make attorney speech sanctionable if it
falsely and recklessly criticizes the integrity of the court or prejudices the
administration of justice.11 Conway agreed to a public reprimand and a fine, but
the Florida Supreme Court asked to be briefed on the First Amendment
implications of the matter.12 In an unpublished disposition, the Florida Supreme
Court approved Conway’s discipline agreement.13
If Conway had not been a lawyer, any punishment for his comments would
likely have been unconstitutional.14 The American Bar Association’s Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, which in some variation or another have been adopted
by almost all states, limit what attorneys may say about judges or the judicial
process under Model Rules 8.215 and 8.4(d).16 Additionally, many court rules
forbid attorneys from conduct that “impugns the integrity of the judiciary.”17 If an
www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2007-04-03-letter%20notifying%2cConway%20
of%20bar%20investigation.pdf (informing Conway that the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Grievance
Committee B had found probable cause that Conway violated bar rules).
11.
Letter from Alan Anthony to Sean Conway, supra note 7. Specifically, Conway was
charged with violating rules 4-8.2(a), 4-8.4(a), 4-8.4(c), and 4-8.4(d). See FLORIDA RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4-8.2 (2007) (“8.2(a) Impugning Qualifications and Integrity of Judges or Other
Officers. A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless
disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, mediator,
arbitrator, adjudicatory officer, public legal officer, juror or member of the venire, or candidate for
election or appointment to judicial or legal office.”); FLORIDA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4
(2007) (“A lawyer shall not: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; . . . (c) engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, except [in certain circumstances
involving undercover investigations]; (d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference,
disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other
lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion,
national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or
physical characteristic . . . .”).
12. See Response to Rule to Show Cause at 2–8, Florida Bar v. Conway, No. SC08-326 (Fla.
Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://jaablog.jaablaw.com/files/34726-32374/response_bar[1].pdf.
13. Florida Bar v. Conway, No. SC08-326, 2008 WL 4748577, at *1 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2008).
14.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently ruled that content-based restrictions
on speech must meet strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1988). Restricting
speech critical of judges is a content-based restriction because it allows for uncritical speech but
punishes comments that are critical. However, some courts have allowed restrictions when attorneys
have made such critical speech. See, e.g., In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487–88 (7th Cir. 1995).
15.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2 (1983) (“(a) A lawyer shall not make a
statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a
candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.”).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (1983) (“It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .”).
17.
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL R. 83.4(b); see also MISSISSIPPI RULES OF
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attorney violates one of these rules, he or she can be referred to a court or state
bar’s disciplinary committee for sanctions or even disbarment.18 Therefore, this
issue has serious implications for the way attorneys present cases, supply
information to the public about the judiciary, and keep judges in check. Several
scholars have argued that attorney speech19 is integral to the public interest and
restrictions on attorney speech should therefore receive the highest constitutional
scrutiny.20 However, many courts have held that attorneys are a unique class that
merit additional burdens on speech.21 For example, in the words of Supreme
Court Justice Potter Stewart, “A lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited
standards of propriety and honor . . . [and] must conform to those standards.”22
Today, the extent to which the bar can regulate attorney speech is a particularly
salient issue due to the pervasive use of social media websites.23
Federal appellate and state supreme courts are divided on what legal standard
to apply when determining whether an attorney’s judicial criticism should receive
protection under the First Amendment. In Standing Committee on Discipline of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California v. Yagman, the Ninth Circuit held
that “statements impugning the integrity of a judge may not be punished unless
they are capable of being proved true or false.”24 The court also ruled that a
statement that prejudices the administration of justice may be sanctioned only
when it poses a “clear and present danger.”25 In contrast, in In re Palmisano, the
Seventh Circuit rejected Yagman and held that attorneys are subject to greater
restrictions on speech by virtue of their bar membership.26 The state supreme
courts have also failed to adopt a uniform standard. A majority of state supreme
courts have adopted an objective standard that evaluates a lawyer’s critical
comments based on what the reasonable attorney would have said in the same
circumstances.27 A minority of state supreme courts have provided greater

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2 (2006); FLORIDA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-8.2(a) (2007).
18.
The Iowa State Bar Association explains its disciplinary procedures on its website. See
Discipline Procedures, IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.iowacourtsonline.org/Professional
_Regulation/Attorney_Discipline/ Discipline_Procedures (last visited Jul. 4, 2011).
19.
“Attorney speech” will be used as a term throughout this article to refer to statements
and opinions made by lawyers that are critical of judges or courts.
20.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First
Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859 (1998); Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial
Integrity in Court Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363 (2010).
21. See infra Part III.D.
22. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646–47 (1959).
23. See Julie Hilden, Should Lawyers Be Allowed to Blog Critically About Judges?, FINDLAW (Sept.
21, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20090921.html.
24.
Standing Comm. on Discipline of U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of California v.
Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995).
25. Id. at 1443.
26. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1995).
27.
Only a couple of state supreme courts, Colorado and Oklahoma, apply the subjective
standard. A majority of states, including Mississippi, Michigan, Ohio, Kansas, Kentucky, Idaho,
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protection for attorney speech critical of the judiciary by adopting the subjective
actual malice standard established by the Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan.28
In this Note, I will argue that a balancing test should be used when deciding
whether attorney speech critical of the judiciary should be punished. Although
almost all of the courts have rooted their standards in defamation law, I assert that
defamation does not provide the most appropriate standard for attorney speech
cases. Defamation is a unique private tort that redresses reputational harm.29 If
reputation is the theory behind restrictions on attorney speech, then lawyers
should not be treated any differently than nonlawyers. Attorney speech is different
because the bar has an organizational interest in regulating its members.
Therefore, another standard should be introduced that addresses the judiciary’s
need to maintain professional standards but also takes into account public
interests, such as the right to receive information and the need for zealous
advocacy from lawyers. I propose a three-part balancing test that weighs judicial
and public interests and examines where the speech occurred in order to
determine whether attorney speech critical of the judiciary may be sanctioned.
In Part II of this Note, I describe the current splits in the federal and state
courts. In Part III, I explain why courts have held that attorney speech may be
restricted. In Part IV, I discuss the policy reasons for and against having
restrictions on attorney speech. In Part V, I explain why courts should not use
standards developed for defamation law to analyze attorney speech critical of the
judiciary. In Part VI, I elaborate on why a balancing test is the most effective
standard of review and I apply the balancing test to the Conway case. I conclude
in Part VII.
II. THE CONFLICT IN THE LAW
Normally under First Amendment analysis, content-based and viewpointbased restrictions on speech must survive the strictest level of constitutional
scrutiny. The government may not restrict or prohibit the content or the topic of
speech unless the government law or action is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government purpose.30 However, courts have never applied this

Massachusetts, New York, Florida, and West Virginia, use the objective standard.
28. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
29.
See Jeffrey A. Plunkett, The Constitutional Law of Defamation: Are All Speakers Protected
Equally?, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 149 (1983).
30. In Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1988), a case about a content-based restriction on
speech, the Supreme Court ruled that a District of Columbia ordinance banning speech critical of
foreign governments in front of their embassies was content-based because it allowed for positive
speech but did not allow for critical speech. The Court applied strict scrutiny review, which the
ordinance failed. The Supreme Court has also defeated subject matter restrictions on speech when the
government has attempted to prohibit certain topics of speech. As an example of a subject matter
restriction, the Court in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), struck down a Chicago ordinance that
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standard to restrictions on attorney speech. All jurisdictions allow restrictions on
attorney criticism of the judiciary in certain circumstances; none apply strict
scrutiny review, despite the fact that these restrictions are both content- and
viewpoint-based. The restrictions are viewpoint-based because they permit
laudatory comments about the judiciary but punish critical comments. Even
jurisdictions that have opted for stronger protection of attorney speech have not
applied strict scrutiny; they rely instead on levels of scrutiny derived from
defamation law to protect the speech. Courts have either chosen to adopt the New
York Times v. Sullivan standard, which evaluates whether the speaker spoke with
subjective malice, or they have adopted an objective standard, which asks whether
the speech conforms to what the reasonable attorney would have done or said in
similar circumstances.31 Even though the Sullivan standard provides strong
constitutional protection, traditional First Amendment analysis would evaluate the
content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on attorney speech under strict scrutiny
review. The use of the Sullivan standard has created rifts among courts about how
to apply the law of defamation to attorneys who criticize judges.
A. The Ninth and Seventh Circuit Split
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have reached contrasting conclusions on
attorney speech critical of the judiciary. In Yagman, the Ninth Circuit held that
attorney speech “impugning the integrity of a judge or the court” could only be
punished if it was factually determined to be false.32 Additionally, the court held
that attorney speech that “prejudices the administration of justice” could only be
punished if it creates a “clear and present danger.”33 The case involved Stephen
Yagman, a prominent civil rights attorney. A legal publication quoted Yagman
accusing a federal district judge of being anti-Semitic and having a penchant for
sanctioning Jewish attorneys.34 Yagman also accused the judge of being “drunk on
the bench,” although that comment was not published.35 Yagman placed an
advertisement in the same publication asking lawyers to contact him if the judge
had ever sanctioned them.36 He was referred to the court’s disciplinary committee,
which sanctioned him for violating rules of court that prohibit attorneys from
“degrad[ing] or impugn[ing] the integrity of the Court” and “interfer[ing] with the

restricted public picketing unless it concerned labor disputes. The Court did so because the law
favored one topic of speech over others.
31.
Standing Comm. on Discipline of U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of California v.
Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1441– 4 2 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting the Sullivan standard); Holtzman v.
Grievance Comm. for the Tenth Judicial Dist., 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991) (adopting the objective
standard).
32. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441–42.
33. Id. at 1443.
34. Id. at 1433–34.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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administration of justice.”37 As a result, a district court disciplinary committee
suspended him from practice in the Central District of California for two years.38
Judge Alex Kozinski, writing for the Ninth Circuit, reversed the district
court’s ruling. Rather than rely on Sullivan, Kozinski looked to other defamation
cases such as Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.39 and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.40
Kozinski concluded that Yagman could not be punished unless there was an
implied factual basis for the statement or the reasonable person would not
perceive the statement to be rhetorical hyperbole.41 Kozinski ultimately held that
Yagman’s statement that the judge was anti-Semitic was a constitutionally
protected statement of opinion because the statement did not imply the existence
of undisclosed facts, but instead was an inference drawn from the facts specified.42
Kozinski held that to prove that Yagman prejudiced the administration of
justice, the district court must show that the statement was a “clear and present
danger” to the administration of justice.43 In holding that Yagman’s statements did
not amount to a clear and present danger to the administration of justice, Kozinski
distinguished Yagman’s situation from the circumstances in Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada.44 In Gentile, the Supreme Court ruled that attorney speech occurring
during a pending case in which the attorney was involved could be sanctioned if it
had a “substantial likelihood” of materially prejudicing the fairness of the trial.45
The case concerned a criminal defense lawyer who held a pretrial press conference
in which he declared that his client was a “scapegoat” and a victim of “crooked
cops.”46 Kozinski distinguished Gentile because Gentile’s speech concerned a
pending case, while Yagman’s statements did not.47 In evaluating the rules of court
that Yagman violated, the Ninth Circuit decided to grant wide protection to
extrajudicial attorney speech. The Yagman court ruled that statements that may
“impugn the integrity of the court” are only punishable if they imply an assertion
of fact or would not be seen as hyperbole by the reasonable person.48 For claims
regarding the prejudice of the administration of justice, the Ninth Circuit adopted

37. Id. at 1435–36.
38. Id. at 1435.
39. 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding that a statement made in the form of an opinion is not
automatically protected speech).
40. 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that public officials and public figures who are targets of
parody cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress unless there is proof of actual
malice).
41. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438.
42. Id. at 1440.
43. Id. at 1442–43.
44. Id. at 1442–44.
45. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1063 (1991).
46. Id. at 1034.
47. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1442–44.
48. Id. at 1438.
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a test that protects the speech unless it poses a “clear and present danger.”49
In In re Palmisano, the Seventh Circuit used a standard very similar to Yagman
but reached a different result.50 The court evaluated attorney speech critical of the
judiciary by determining whether the statement implied an assertion of fact that
could be verified as true or false.51 However, unlike Yagman, the Palmisano court
decided to uphold the attorney sanctions because it characterized the attorney’s
speech as statements of fact, rather than opinion.52 There, Judge Easterbrook
considered a situation where an attorney accused several federal district judges of
corruption and taking bribes.53 Judge Easterbrook approached the situation by
immediately recognizing that attorneys lack the same freedom to speak as
nonattorneys.54 Because indiscriminate accusations against judges affect the
functioning of the court, Easterbrook reasoned that “[c]ourts therefore may
require attorneys to speak with greater care and civility than is the norm in
political campaigns.”55 In deciding to uphold the sanction, the court wrote, “[T]he
Constitution does not give attorneys the same freedom as participants in political
debate.”56 Much like the Yagman court, Easterbrook invoked notions of
defamation law, relying on Milkovich to explain that Palmisano could not hide
behind a defense that his statements were opinion when they were embedded in
facts.57
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit granted wide discretion
to disciplinary committees of federal courts to sanction attorney speech critical of
the judiciary. The Seventh Circuit went beyond Palmisano’s particular case, and
essentially held that attorneys forego certain First Amendment rights as members
of the bar. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, did not explicitly rule on
whether attorneys lose some First Amendment privileges, but clearly suggested
that attorney speech should be judged in the same way as speech by nonlawyers.
This circuit split therefore reflects a fundamental difference in policy regarding the
ability of attorneys to criticize judges and the judiciary.
B. The Conflict Among the States
State supreme courts are equally divided on this issue. Whereas the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits grounded their rulings in a variety of federal defamation cases,
state supreme courts have either adopted the defamation standard established in
Sullivan with its prong of actual or subjective malice, or they have chosen an
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1442–43.
70 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 487–88.
Id.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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objective malice standard that asks what the reasonable attorney would say in the
same circumstances. The objective standard has been best described by the New
York Court of Appeals, which concluded in Holtzman v. Grievance Committee for the
Tenth Judicial District that “[i]t is the reasonableness of the belief, not the state of
mind of the attorney, that is determinative.”58 A majority of state supreme courts
have chosen the objective approach.59 The division among state supreme courts
ultimately centers on the question of whether attorneys should be subject to more
restrictions on speech by virtue of bar membership. In most cases, the courts have
expressed fear that failing to sanction attorney speech will inevitably lead to a
poorer-functioning judiciary and erode its efficacy as an institution.60 As a practical
concern, judges have also worried that attorney speech might unnecessarily disrupt
proceedings.61 Another reason implied and sometimes stated by judges is that the
public might lose confidence in the judiciary as an institution if attorneys
constantly scrutinized courts, particularly with offensive, accusatory, or false
statements.62 This argument concludes that if the courts lose public confidence,
then their decisions will have less power and society will become more disorderly.
While state supreme courts have not banned critical attorney speech wholesale,
they have indicated three situations where speech critical of judges or the judiciary
may be punished: (a) statements made during a judicial proceeding, (b) statements
made after a judicial proceeding, and (c) statements made without connection to a
judicial proceeding.
1. Punishable Statements Under the Objective Standard
a. During Judicial Proceedings
Courts using the objective standard have upheld the punishment of attorney
criticism made in an official court submission or during the course of a case. In
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, the lawyer, Gardner, criticized a panel of
judges in a motion for reconsideration, writing that they should have been
“ashamed” of their initial opinion.63 He also accused them of ruling based on their
desire to be seen as tough on crime.64 In reviewing the sanctions against Gardner,
the Ohio Supreme Court adopted an objective malice standard, explaining that the

58. 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991).
59. See supra note 27.
60. See Mississippi Bar v. Lumumba, 912 So. 2d 871 (Miss. 2005), reinstatement granted sub nom.,
In re Lumumba, 962 So. 2d 536 (Miss. 2007) (holding that attorney statements are sanctionable when
they directly relate to judicial proceedings and damage the public confidence in the judiciary).
61. Id. at 878.
62. See, e.g., U.S. Dist. Court for E.D. of Wash. v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1993);
Lumumba, 912 So. 2d at 885–86; Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d at 33.
63. 99 Ohio St. 3d 416, 417, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, 427, reinstatement granted, 101
Ohio St. 3d 1241, 2004-Ohio-1209, 805 N.E.2d 98.
64. Id.

Assembled V1I4 3.28.2012 (Do Not Delete)

1230

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/6/2012 4:04 PM

[Vol. 1:1221

“state’s compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the judiciary
supports applying a standard in disciplinary proceedings different from that
applicable in defamation cases.”65 The court elaborated that “[u]nder the objective
standard, an attorney may still freely exercise free speech rights and make
statements supported by a reasonable factual basis, even if the attorney turns out
to be mistaken.”66
Applying this standard, the Ohio Supreme Court found no trouble
upholding Gardner’s six-month suspension. The court wrote that “[u]nfounded
attacks against the integrity of the judiciary require an actual suspension from the
practice of law.”67 No other state court has gone so far. Some attorneys note that
the purpose of motions and appeals is to criticize the judiciary in some respect by
pointing out its errors.68 While Gardner may have been zealously advocating on
behalf of his client, the Ohio Supreme Court suspended him from practice,
perhaps because the criticism was in an official court document.
In most cases, the speech under scrutiny occurs when the lawyer criticizes a
judge’s action in the lawyer’s case, usually in an off-handed comment in or out of
court. In Mississippi Bar v. Lumumba, for example, an attorney in a criminal
proceeding, Lumumba, implied the judge was corrupt by telling the judge he was
“willing to pay for justice” at a hearing for posttrial motions.69 Lumumba was
charged with contempt for his in-court comments, and subsequently called the
judge a “barbarian” out of court during an interview regarding the contempt
charges.70 The Mississippi Supreme Court held that Lumumba’s conduct
prejudiced the administration of justice.71 It reasoned that both Lumumba’s outof-court and in-court statements were punishable because they were still
“connected” to a current judicial proceeding, in this case the trial that Lumumba
was conducting for his client.72
While the “connection” that the Mississippi Supreme Court viewed as
prejudicial to the administration of justice was arguably attenuated, most jurists
would probably agree that attorney speech should be sanctioned if it actually
disrupts the judicial process.73 Although most state supreme courts assume that
attorney speech criticizing a judge or court can seriously disrupt the functioning of
a trial, courts rarely find that the attorney actually caused a disruption.74 Reviewing

65. Id. at 423.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 424.
68. See Steven Wisotsky, Incivility and Unprofessionalism on Appeal: Impugning the Integrity of Judges,
7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 303 (2005).
69. In re Lumumba, 912 So. 2d 871, 875 (Miss. 2005).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 882.
72. Id. at 883.
73. Defining what constitutes an “actual disruption” may be difficult for jurists.
74.
Cf. Lumumba, 912 So. 2d at 888–89 (attorney’s comments were so disruptive that they
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courts have merely speculated about the potential damage, as opposed to requiring
any actual disruption caused by the speech.
b. Statements Made After a Proceeding
The more controversial rulings that affect attorney speech occur in situations
where lawyers speak outside of the courtroom about a case in which they were
involved after the proceeding has ended. For example, in In re Westfall, a Missouri
prosecutor named George Westfall went on television to criticize an opinion by an
appellate court.75 Westfall accused one judge of distorting the law to the judge’s
liking.76 In reviewing the advisory committee’s findings and recommendations, the
Missouri Supreme Court applied the objective test and ruled that Westfall had
failed to adequately research his claims and that his “statements imputed lack of
integrity and misconduct in the judge’s professional work.”77 Similarly, in Grievance
Administrator v. Fieger, Fieger, a Michigan lawyer who represented a client in a
medical malpractice proceeding, made a radio appearance after the appellate
court’s ruling and launched vulgar comments against the judges, stating that one
particular judge should stick his finger up his anus.78 The Michigan Supreme Court
held: “[S]uch coarseness in the context of an officer of the court participating in a
legal proceeding warrants no First Amendment protection when balanced against
this state’s compelling interest in maintaining public respect for the integrity of the
legal process.”79 In both Westfall and Fieger, the trial or hearing was over, yet the
courts extended the reach of the professional conduct rules to all matters
pertaining to the litigation. The consequence of such a rule is that the attorneys
who try a case and have the greatest perspective and knowledge to comment on
the matter may be prohibited from making public comments criticizing the
judiciary because of their involvement in the litigation.
c. Statements Made Without Involvement in a Proceeding
Punishment for attorney speech that is not connected to a pending trial or
proceeding is even more problematic. In Idaho State Bar v. Topp, for example, the
Idaho Supreme Court punished an attorney who was not involved in the
proceeding at issue.80 Topp was a part-time county lawyer who observed a heated
public judicial proceeding where the county government requested a judicial
confirmation of a multimillion dollar expenditure.81 After the proceedings, local

caused mistrial).
75. 808 S.W.2d 829, 831–32 (Mo. 1991).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 838.
78. Grievance Adm’r v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 129 (Mich. 2006).
79. Id. at 142.
80. Idaho State Bar v. Topp, 925 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Idaho 1996).
81. Id.
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media interviewed Topp about the judge’s decision to decline the county’s
request.82 Topp suggested that the elected judge’s decision might have been
motivated in part by political concerns due to the public frenzy surrounding the
funding request.83 The Idaho Supreme Court held a reasonable attorney would not
have made Topp’s statement in that situation and upheld a lower court’s public
reprimand of Topp.84
Of increasing concern for younger attorneys is the use of social media
websites, such as blogs, to express their views. As discussed in Part I, the Florida
Supreme Court upheld monetary sanctions against attorney Sean Conway, who
called a judge “an Evil, Unfair Witch” on a blog in response to the judge’s practice
of allowing defense lawyers only one week to prepare for trial.85 While the Florida
Supreme Court did not explain its ruling, the case has many implications for
attorneys who maintain personal web-based profiles or diaries that may include
off-the-cuff remarks about the judicial competency of specific judges. It is perhaps
the fear incarnate of Judge Kozinski’s concern in Yagman that punishing such
speech could result in a chilling effect: “[A] speech restriction that is not bounded
by a particular trial or other judicial proceeding does far more than merely
postpone speech; it permanently inhibits what lawyers may say about the court
and its judges—whether their statements are true or false.”86
2. Protected Attorney Speech Under the Sullivan Standard
Other state supreme courts have directly disagreed with the objective
standard used in the majority of states because it conflicts with public policy
interests. In In re Green, Green, an African American attorney practicing in
Colorado, sent a letter to a judge and opposing counsel in the course of
proceedings.87 The letter suggested that the judge was biased against him and his
client and accused the judge of being racist based on a previous encounter in the
clerk’s office.88 The Colorado Supreme Court adopted a subjective standard
similar to that in New York Times v. Sullivan, becoming the most recent state
supreme court to do so.89 However, In re Green is distinguishable from the cases
82. Id. at 1114.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1117.
85.
Florida Bar v. Conway, No. SC08-326, 2008 WL 4748577, at *1 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2008)
(order approving report of referee and conditional guilty plea); John Schwartz, A Legal Battle for
Lawyers: Online Attitude Vs. Rules of the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com
/2009/09/13/us/13lawyers.html.
86.
Standing Comm. on Discipline of U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of California v.
Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1443 (9th Cir. 1995).
87. In re Green, 11 P.3d 1078, 1082–83 (Colo. 2000).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1085 (The court laid out the following test: “(1) whether the disciplinary authority
has proven that the statement was a false statement of fact (or a statement of opinion that necessarily
implies an undisclosed false assertion of fact); and (2) assuming the statement is false, whether the
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noted above because the audience of the critical speech was limited to the judge
and opposing counsel, and, at least in regard to the racism charge, Green cited to
an actual personal encounter with the judge to support his contention that the
judge was bigoted.90
The facts of the case are such that the Colorado Supreme Court could have
probably ruled in favor of Green using the objective test, but it decided to expand
First Amendment protection for attorneys by adopting the subjective standard.
Even though Green’s criticism was not meant to reach the public, the justices of
the court found particularly compelling the argument that attorney speech should
be highly protected because it is the main informational pipeline to the public
about the functioning of the judiciary.91 The court wrote that protecting attorney
speech is particularly important in a state that elects its judges.92 The court noted
that attorneys play a unique role in educating the public about the judiciary
because lawyers are the “class of people in the best position to comment on the
functioning of the judicial system.”93 Much of the Colorado Supreme Court’s
reasoning was based on rulings from the supreme courts in Oklahoma and
Tennessee, which found it especially important for lawyers to have full First
Amendment protection to criticize judges in order to have a more informed
public.94 Despite this strong public policy rationale of fully protecting attorneys’
speech because they are in the best position to inform the public, the vast majority
of states have continued to uphold restrictions on attorney speech critical of the
courts and judges.
III. SUPREME COURT RULINGS PROVIDE LEGAL AND HISTORICAL SUPPORT FOR
MAINTAINING RESTRICTIONS ON ATTORNEY SPEECH
Many scholars have decried the ease with which some courts restrict attorney
speech and have called for the highest constitutional protection for speech
criticizing judges.95 The jurisprudential disagreement on these restrictions seems to
turn in large part on whether protecting the integrity of the judiciary justifies a
restriction on attorney speech. Whether the current standard is desirable will be
discussed later, but nowhere in their decisions have courts discussed whether the
bar has the legal ability to make content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on
speech. Although the United States Supreme Court has never decided a case
regarding criticism of the judiciary by attorneys, analogous First Amendment
attorney uttered the statement with actual malice—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth.”).
90. Id. at 1082.
91. Id. at 1085.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1988); Ramsey v. Bd. of Prof’l
Responsibility, 771 S.W.2d 116, 120–22 (Tenn. 1989).
95. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20; Tarkington, supra note 20.
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decisions by the Court suggest that curtailing such speech does not violate the
First Amendment.
A. The Supreme Court’s Affirmation of the Hatch Act Supports the Claim That a Branch of
Government Can Restrict the Speech of Its Employees or Members
The Supreme Court cases that have affirmed the Hatch Act support the bar’s
ability to restrict attorney speech. In 1939 Congress passed the Hatch Act, which
prevents federal civil servants from using their influence in political campaigns.96
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld this law. The Supreme Court first
ruled on the law’s constitutional validity in United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.)
v. Mitchell.97 In upholding the law, the Court listed several policy reasons, including
preventing a one-party political system, preventing government employers from
forcing employees to ascribe to certain political views or political parties, and
preventing a distortion of the political process.98 Another key policy reason that
the Court accepted was Congress’s desire to efficiently run government.99 The
Court deferred to Congress’s judgment on how best to achieve governmental
efficiency.100 Though the Court recognized that upholding the law would restrict
political speech and association outside the realm of the employees’ offices, the
Court explained that “[t]he influence of political activity by government
employees, if evil in its effects on the service, the employees or people dealing
with them, is hardly less so because that activity takes place after hours.”101 In
deferring to congressional and executive judgment, the Court decided that the
branches of government could regulate the political activities of federal employees
outside of work. A few decades later the Court reaffirmed Mitchell in U.S. Civil
Service Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers.102 The Court wrote in revisiting
the law that “neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the
Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by
federal employees.”103
What makes these rulings so important to any justifications by courts to
restrict certain speech is the Supreme Court’s deference to institutional wisdom in
order to achieve greater governmental efficiency. The Court confronted issues of
regulatory restrictions on employee speech and chose efficiency and other
rationales over the First Amendment concerns of civil servants.104 These cases
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
(1973).
103.
104.

5 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1508, 7321–7326 (2006).
United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
See id. at 100.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 95.
U.S. Civil Service Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548
Id. at 556.
Caprice L. Roberts, Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman: Missing the Point of
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support the proposition that people who choose to join a regulated profession
may not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment.105 They also suggest
that, as long as the government provides strong policies justifying the First
Amendment restrictions, courts will find that those policies will outweigh the
rights of employees.106 Justifications for maintaining certain restrictions on
attorney speech will be discussed in detail in Part IV, but these Supreme Court
rulings appear to give the government wide discretion in regulating the conduct,
participation, and speech of employees, particularly when weighed against efficient
government administration.
However, there are some weaknesses in the analogy between government
employers and their employees under the Hatch Act and lawyers and the bar
associations that regulate them. First, the bar does not employ its members.
Second, and most importantly, it is questionable whether courts can be considered
government policy makers107 like the members of the legislative and executive
branches. State and federal bars may also be analogous to legislative policy makers
because ultimately their authority is derived from the political branches of
government.108 If the Supreme Court determines that courts can be considered
policy makers, then court rules concerning attorney speech would likely be given
deferential treatment similar to that of Congress. Without clarity from the
Supreme Court it is difficult to determine whether a court restriction on its
members can be likened to legislative restrictions under the Hatch Act, but in
certain situations the Supreme Court has ruled that the courts can be considered
government actors.109 Accepting the analogy of bar associations or courts as policy
makers would support restrictions on attorney speech under the Hatch Act line of
cases.
B. The Supreme Court Has Upheld Restrictions on Attorney Solicitation and Advertising
Supreme Court rulings regarding advertising services and the solicitation of
potential clients also lend support to restrictions on attorney speech. In Ohralik v.

Ethical Restrictions on Attorney Criticism of the Judiciary?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 817, 852–53 (1997).
105. Id. at 852.
106. Id. at 853.
107.
In state courts, the state bar, which is generally an administrative arm of the state
supreme court, regulates professional discipline. California, for instance, has the State Bar Court, a
special court that administers professional discipline. See State Bar Court of California: General Information,
STATE BAR COURT OF CAL., http://www.statebarcourt.ca.gov/home.aspx (last visited Jul. 10, 2011).
In federal court, each individual court or circuit may have its own individual set of rules.
108. As an example, “[t]he State Bar of California was created by legislative act in 1927 and
codified in the California Constitution at Article VI, section 9.” Ctr. for Pub. Int. Law, State Bar of
California, 17 CAL. REG. L. REP. 339, 339 (2001). Federal trial and appellate courts each have their
own bars; however, each court, excluding the Supreme Court, is created and funded by Congress.
109. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (holding “[t]hat the action of state courts and
judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
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Ohio State Bar Ass’n, the Supreme Court ruled that the government may ban inperson solicitations by attorneys.110 The Court found the government’s argument
in favor of the restrictions persuasive mainly because the law protected victims
from “fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of
‘vexatious conduct.’”111 The Court distinguished Ohralik from In re Primus,112
where the Court struck down restrictions on in-person pro bono solicitations. The
Court revisited the issue a decade later in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n and struck
down restrictions on direct-mail solicitations.113 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has
pointed out that Ohralik, Primus, and Shapero establish that states may prohibit inperson solicitations of clients for profit, but may not prohibit in-person
solicitations if the attorney works without pay or solicits through the mail.114
However, the Supreme Court eroded this proposition in Florida Bar v. Went For
It.115 In Went For It, the Supreme Court upheld Florida’s thirty-day prohibition on
attorneys for communicating with victims who have suffered from personal injury
or wrongful death.116 In upholding the law, the Court applied intermediate
scrutiny: “The Bar has substantial interest both in protecting injured Floridians
from invasive conduct by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in
the profession that such repeated invasions have engendered.”117 In re Primus and
Went For It establish that the Court is willing to uphold restrictions on attorney
conduct that might damage the integrity of the legal profession.
The Court has singled out attorney speech for a higher level of regulation
than other professions because of the unique status attorneys have in American
society. The Supreme Court illustrated this point when deciding the
constitutionality of a state law that prohibited in-person solicitation by
accountants.118 In Edenfield v. Fane, the Court struck down the law but
distinguished its ruling from In re Primus by noting that, unlike a lawyer, a certified
public accountant is not “a professional trained in the art of persuasion.”119 An
accountant’s training emphasizes “independence and objectivity rather than
advocacy.”120 The Court essentially acknowledged that attorneys might be subject
to more speech restrictions than other groups of professionals because of their
high level of sophistication. While the argument that lawyers are generally more
persuasive than accountants may be spurious, this signals that courts may be
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
ed. 2006).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

436 U.S. 447, 466–68 (1978).
Id. at 462.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1097 (3d
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
Id. at 618–19.
Id. at 635.
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
Id. at 775.
Id.
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willing to permit greater regulation of speech by attorneys than other professional
groups. Although these cases fall mainly under commercial speech jurisprudence,
the fact that the Court has singled out lawyers as a group and curtailed some
aspects of their free speech suggests that court rules limiting attorneys’ ability to
criticize the judiciary can survive higher levels of constitutional scrutiny.
C. Attorneys Are Subject to Restrictions Under First Amendment Jurisprudence in the
Workplace
One commonly offered rationale for restrictions on attorney speech is
attorneys’ status as officers of the court. In cases stretching back 150 years the
Supreme Court has recognized that attorneys, as officers of the court, assume
restrictions on their speech and actions.121 While the phrase “officer of the court”
is nebulous in terms of additional duties placed on attorneys, it does invoke
similarities to an employer-employee relationship.122 State and federal bars
administer the regulatory aspects of the legal profession, including admission and
disciplinary action, but they do not employ their members.123 Nevertheless, the
relationship resembles that of employer to employee in that the bar dictates the
way lawyers must conduct themselves in order to maintain their licenses to work.
Professor Terri Day observes that attorneys have the same responsibilities as
public employees to facilitate the administration of justice and that they are subject
to significant control and restrictions by courts, particularly in the courtroom and
during trials.124 Similarly, Professor W. Bradley Wendel observes that, although
nongovernment lawyers represent private interests, they still must conform their
strategies to the rule of law and may not help their clients in furthering a crime.125
Wendel writes, “[l]awyers are not literally public employees, but their acts do take
on a public quality by virtue of the power of lawyers to invoke the official
apparatus of the state.”126 Accepting that lawyers resemble public employees in
some manner, the law gives wide discretion to the employer in regulating
employee speech, although this depends on whether the speech was made on or
121. But on the other hand the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do
not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the [B]ar, is
not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the
respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining
out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
for their judicial acts.
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335, 355 (1871).
122. Terri R. Day, Speak No Evil: Legal Ethics v. The First Amendment, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 161,
187–88 (2008).
123. For a description of how disciplinary proceedings work in the Ninth Circuit, see PAUL
W. VAPNEK ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 11-173 to -178
(2010).
124. Day, supra note 122.
125. W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 375 (2001).
126. Id.
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off the job.
In Pickering v. Board of Education, a public school teacher was fired for sending
a letter to a local newspaper criticizing how the school board and the school
district superintendent had handled past proposals to raise new revenue.127 The
Supreme Court ruled that the teacher’s First Amendment rights had been violated.
The Court adopted a balancing test which provides that the government
employee’s speech cannot be punished if the speech involves a matter of public
concern and the employee’s free speech interests outweigh the government’s
interest in efficiently administering a public service.128 The Supreme Court in
Garcetti v. Ceballos altered the analysis of public employee speech in regard to
statements made in the course of employment.129 In that case, a Los Angeles
deputy district attorney’s superiors allegedly retaliated against him for writing
memos criticizing the way the district attorney’s office had handled a case.130 The
Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.”131 The Court largely deferred to the judgment of supervisors
in regulating employee speech to make sure it is both accurate and reflects the
goals of the institution.132 One of the key questions the Court answered was
whether Ceballos was writing in the capacity of a private citizen. The Court
answered no.133
Pickering and Ceballos may not have an effect on attorney speech because
lawyers are not public employees by virtue of bar membership. However, if courts
decide to accept the employer/employee analogy, Ceballos may give them more
power to restrict attorney speech. If an attorney criticizes a judge in relation to an
ongoing proceeding, the bar’s analogous role as employer might give it the power
to restrict the attorney’s speech under the notion of general deference to
professional standards described in Ceballos. However, if speech critical of the
judiciary did not occur in connection with an ongoing proceeding, then the
Pickering test would probably protect attorney speech as long as the speech related
to a matter of public concern. Perhaps the Court’s conclusion is similar to
Professor Kathleen Sullivan’s statement, before Ceballos was decided, that “when
speaking in capacities that might adversely implicate the administration of justice
or perception of administration of justice by the government . . . the Court has
regarded the government as freer to place conditions on its sponsorship.”134
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
See id. at 568.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 422.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on
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However, Ceballos only indirectly concerned lawyer speech. It is uncertain whether
the result would have differed had nonlawyers been involved, but it is plausible
that the Court took into account that the speech in controversy was made by
attorneys.
Much like the Hatch Act cases, the Ceballos Court easily deferred to the
judgment of the government employer. These cases do not articulate a standard by
which to evaluate attorney speech, but they do suggest that public employers,
which can be analogized in certain respects to the bar, sometimes have the power
to curb attorney speech.
D. Attorney Speech Has Historically Been Limited by the Conception of Attorneys as Officers
of the Court
The debate surrounding attorney speech has much to do with the notion that
lawyers are officers of the court. This terminology is in many ways a fiction. It is a
commonly used legal phrase that carries with it very little substance, but in this
context has been used to describe the ethical and professional duties a lawyer
acquires as a bar member. The notion of how an officer of the court should act
has its roots in early discussions of how to regulate the legal profession.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, American jurists who began
formulating ethical guidelines for attorneys confronted issues about the way
attorneys ought to act. According to Alfred Konefsky, there were two camps of
thought in antebellum legal circles.135 The camp led by University of Maryland
Professor David Hoffman believed that attorneys’ duties should be guided by
both moral judgment and the public interest.136 Hoffman maintained that ethical
codes would be necessary to describe and prescribe virtue in a world of open bar
membership, where lawyers were no longer only from elite families.137 The other
camp, led by Professor George Sharswood, cut away at Hoffman’s image of the
virtuous lawyer, instead arguing that an attorney should be a zealous advocate
constrained only by the law.138 The Hoffman-Sharswood debate is at the center of
defining whether the attorney, as an officer of the court, acquires additional
behavioral responsibilities as a bar member. Although scholars have debated about
what makes one an officer of a court, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that attorneys are subject to more speech restrictions, even when their speech
occurs outside the courtroom.
The first case, Bradley v. Fisher, dates back to 1871 when an attorney

Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 587 (1998).
135.
Alfred S. Konefsky, The Legal Profession, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
A MERICA : T HE L ONG N INETEENTH C ENTURY (1789–1920) 68, 101 (Michael Grossberg &
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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defending a conspirator in the killing of Abraham Lincoln insulted the trial judge
with “chastising” comments as he descended from the bench.139 In affirming the
lawyer’s disbarment for comments made in court, the Supreme Court wrote that
maintaining respect and integrity to the court does not end in the courtroom, “but
it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally for their judicial acts.”140 The Court
recognized that “professional fidelity may be violated by acts which fall without
the lines of professional functions, and which may have been performed out of
the pale of the court.”141
The next time the Supreme Court dealt with attorney speech was in In re
Sawyer. In Sawyer, an attorney was representing a group of defendants being
prosecuted under the Smith Act.142 In an address to the public, the attorney said,
“[t]here’s no fair trial in the case. They just make up the rules as they go along.”143
She was referred to a disciplinary committee and sanctioned because the
committee thought that her comments impugned the integrity of the trial court
judge.144 The Supreme Court reversed Sawyer’s sanction because it ruled that
lawyers are free to criticize the state of the law.145 However, in the very same
opinion, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, concluded that a lawyer does
not acquire a “license” to impugn the integrity of a judge or attack a judge’s
administration of justice, even if the lawyer is not involved in pending litigation.146
Justice Stewart’s concurrence is perhaps the most quoted opinion in attorney
speech discussions. He stated that lawyers belong to a profession with “inherited
standards of propriety and honor” and then compared lawyers to doctors, who
cannot use the First Amendment as protection from discipline if they reveal
confidential information about patients.147 In Justice Frankfurter’s dissent, he
argued that attorney speech critical of the judiciary can be dangerous because of
the potential “inflaming and warping significance” it may have on the public’s
view of the judicial process.148
In the 1985 case of In re Snyder, the Supreme Court addressed a situation
where an attorney was sanctioned for a letter he wrote criticizing the way the
Court of Appeals had treated an indigent defendant.149 The Court struck down the
139. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (1 Well.) 335 (1871).
140. Id. at 336.
141. Id. at 355.
142. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959). The Smith Act is a federal law passed in 1940 that sets
criminal penalties for people who advocate or aid in the overthrow of the United States. 18 U.S.C. §
2385 (2006).
143. Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 630.
144. Id. at 623–25.
145. Id. at 630.
146. Id. at 636.
147. Id. at 646–47.
148. Id. at 669.
149. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
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sanction because it decided that the attorney was mainly criticizing the law, which
is permissible. However, in dicta the Court wrote:
As an officer of the court, a member of the Bar enjoys singular powers
that others do not possess; by virtue of admission, members of the Bar
share a kind of monopoly granted only to lawyers. Admission creates a
license not only to advise and counsel clients but to appear in court and
try cases; as an officer of the court, a lawyer can cause persons to drop
their private affairs and be called as witnesses in court, and for
depositions and other pretrial processes that, while subject to the ultimate
control of the court, may be conducted outside courtrooms. The license
granted by the court requires members of the Bar to conduct themselves
in a manner compatible with the role of courts in the administration of
justice.150
In its most recent case addressing attorney speech, the Court in Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada struck down the punishment of an attorney who made
statements to the press about the innocence of his client after an indictment was
issued against the client.151 While the main issue the Court decided was whether
the speech would prejudice the trial, Justice O’Connor wrote in her concurrence
that “[l]awyers are officers of the court and, as such, may legitimately be subject to
ethical precepts that keep them from engaging in what otherwise might be
constitutionally protected speech.”152 She recognized that attorneys do not forfeit
all of their free speech rights, but that there are circumstances, such as the one the
Court was deciding, where attorney speech could be limited.153 The Supreme
Court has never decided whether rules that prohibit extrajudicial speech critical of
the judiciary are constitutional, but the cases cited above are closest to the point.
Collectively, they have precedential value and suggest that the Supreme Court
would likely view these restrictions as constitutional.
IV. POLICY REASONS FOR SUPPORTING OR REJECTING ATTORNEY SPEECH
BASED ON THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, ATTORNEYS, AND THE
PUBLIC
The reason why courts are so divided on the issue of attorney speech critical
of the judiciary is disagreement about the societal function of such speech. As
noted above, the courts that have granted greater protection to attorney speech
critical of the judiciary believe that attorneys act as an important informational

150. Id. at 644–45.
151.
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). In coming to its decision, the
Supreme Court analyzed the application of Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177. The rule was based on
the American Bar Association’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6, which governs pretrial
publicity. The Court wrote that Model Rule 3.6 was not necessarily unconstitutional, but that
Nevada’s interpretation of the rule was not in constitutional conformity. Id. at 1036.
152. Id. at 1081–82.
153. Id.
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source to the public about the state of the judiciary.154 Judges who have upheld
restrictions on attorney speech believe it can unnecessarily damage the integrity of
the courts, disrupt the functioning of the judiciary, and undermine its opinions.155
This Part will discuss why such restrictions may or may not be desirable.
A. Why Restrictions on Attorney Speech Are Not Always Desirable
Some courts justify placing special restrictions on attorneys by asserting or
implying that attorneys are a specialized class in American society. The granting of
bar membership gives lawyers exclusive access to use the judicial system. Unlike
other professional regulatory bodies, the judiciary is a branch of the government.
While the political branches of government are heavily covered by the media and
can be changed by public involvement, the courts remain somewhat insular. The
judiciary’s inner workings and opinions go largely unnoticed by the general public.
Additionally, most people lack the requisite legal knowledge to effectively evaluate
the performance of judges. In states where judges are elected, nonattorneys still
have very little exposure to courts unless they are personally involved in litigation,
and even then they may not fully understand the implications of a court ruling or a
judge’s action.
Because lawyers have this exclusive access to the judiciary and have attained
advanced legal knowledge, they play an important role in disseminating
information about the functioning of the courts as well as the competency of
judges. This role is seriously undermined if lawyers face the possibility of sanctions
for their criticisms. Thus, attorney speech restrictions threaten not only the rights
of lawyers but also the right of the public to receive information.156 The right of
the public to receive information relates to many of the rationales behind the First
Amendment, such as promoting individual autonomy, discovering the truth, and
enhancing the democratic process.157 Restricting attorney speech deprives the
public of important information about the judiciary. This is particularly important
in states where judges are elected. Furthermore, instead of promoting public
confidence in the judiciary, restricting attorney speech may in fact erode that trust
by creating the appearance that judges are merely attempting to insulate
themselves from expected criticism of their professional duties.158
Restricting attorney speech may also impair attorneys from fully advocating
for their clients. Out-of-court speech can be applied in numerous ways to help

154. See, e.g., In re Green, 11 P.3d 1078, 1085 (Colo. 2000).
155. See, e.g., In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995).
156. Angela Butcher & Scott Macbeth, Lawyers’ Comments About Judges: A Balancing of Interests to
Ensure a Sound Judiciary, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 659, 672–73 (2004).
157. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877
(1963).
158.
Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and
Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1605–09 (2009).
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clients, such as using the media to counter negative publicity or gathering crucial
evidence.159 Sometimes clients have matters that go beyond the courtroom and are
meant to galvanize the public.160 Limiting a lawyer’s ability to fully advocate for
such clients could call into question the motives of judges who contend that their
reputational or judicial efficiency concerns take precedence over client advocacy.
If attorney speech is essential to client representation, then any limitations on that
speech harm clients.
B. Why Restrictions on Attorney Speech Are Desirable
There are also legitimate professional reasons why these restrictions on
attorney speech should be in place. First, speech can damage how courts function.
The judiciary is a large organization that relies on its reputation as a neutral arbiter
to effectuate its power. If the integrity of the judiciary is severely diminished, then
its opinions and rulings may lose effect.
Second, judges, in their own capacity or as officers of the court, lack the
ability to counter critical speech. Judges are confined by their own canons of
judicial conduct that limit what they may say in public.161 Moreover, these canons
of conduct obligate judges to uphold the integrity of the court by enforcing rules
of professional conduct.162 While judges should expect to be criticized because of
their immense power, they probably do not expect to endure personal attacks
about issues such as financial impropriety, alcoholism, or racial discrimination.
One of the primary rationales behind allowing public officials to be open to
reputational attack is that they have access to the channels of communication to
counter the speech.163 Judges do not enjoy this same access because they must
comply with their own ethical restrictions. Therefore, the inability of judges to
effectively counter attorney speech provides some basis for the argument that
attorney speech against the judiciary should be restricted.
This rationale also casts doubt on whether defamation law is the proper
source to analyze this type of speech. As a government actor, the court or bar
cannot sue the attorney for defamation, which leaves these institutions with
almost no recourse against the harmful effects of the speech. An individual judge
may sue for defamation,164 but that provides little redress to the integrity of the

159. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 868–71.
160.
Id. Countless cases have been brought to raise attention to issues affecting particular
segments of American society; they range from racial inequality to reproductive rights.
161. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 4 (2009); CAL. CODE OF
JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2–5 (2008).
162. See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3 (2008).
163. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
164. See Keohane v. Wilkerson, 859 P.2d 291 (Colo. App. 1993) (district court judge brought
and succeeded in part in a defamation claim against a newspaper editor, the author of published
letters to the editor, and a city councilman), aff’d sub nom., Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293 (Colo.
1994).
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judiciary. It also has the undesirable consequence of having judges act as plaintiffs
in order to enforce what should be a professional regulatory matter concerning
attorney misconduct.
Third, the bar’s restrictions on attorney speech ultimately protect the legal
consumer by punishing lawyers who cross the line with the judiciary. Whether or
not attorney speech criticizing judges is desirable, it is generally seen as bad
lawyering. Punishing such lawyers should deter lawyering that may damage the
advocacy of a client and inform the public of the lawyer’s professional
competence.
The arguments above illustrate several of the policy rationales for allowing or
not allowing attorneys to criticize the judiciary with impunity. The ultimate
question is the relative value of attorney speech in representing clients and
informing the public versus maintaining judicial integrity and effective judicial
administration. Courts have either decided to adopt an objective or
subjective/actual malice standard depending on how they weigh the importance of
these competing values.165 While an objective or subjective standard would be
appropriate in an ordinary defamation context, the fact that restrictions on
attorney speech implicate professional regulatory issues changes the analysis. In
the next part, I will discuss why defamation standards are not the most effective
way of evaluating attorney speech and why another standard should be adopted.
V. THE FRAMEWORK FOR AN ALTERNATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Attorney Speech Is Grounded in Professional Conduct
Attorney speech should be treated differently from traditional methods of
First Amendment protection because it is uniquely grounded in professional
conduct. As Professor Tarkington writes, “attorney speech is special.”166 She
explains that attorney speech is unique because it is “tie[d] to the government and
the force of law,” and its words are used to achieve a desired legal result.167
Similarly, Professor W. Bradley Wendel recognizes that attorney speech is
different because it can change the rights and obligations of others.168 Professor
Wendel observes a distinction between speech by attorneys and ordinary citizens
in that the former is an outgrowth of professional conduct.169 The way attorneys
write and speak is how they professionally act. Thus, when lawyers write or speak
in relation to something legal they are not merely speaking, but acting in their
professional capacities.

165. See supra Part II.
166.
Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney Speech 10
(Aug. 31 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669617.
167. Id. at 13.
168. Wendel, supra note 125, at 362.
169. Id.
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Professor Tarkington believes that, even though attorney speech is unique
and different from regular conceptions of speech, it should still receive special
protection.170 While I agree with Tarkington that attorney speech should be given
special consideration due to its unique power, the professional nature of attorney
speech should also allow the bar more room to impose restrictions for regulatory
purposes. If the argument for enlarging the protection of attorney speech is that it
has a particularly important place in society, then the bar should be able to make
sure that power is not abused. Once there is recognition that attorney speech is
different because of the professional context, it is worthwhile to ask whether
traditional methods of analysis are the most useful.
B. Defamation Law Is Not the Most Appropriate Standard to Evaluate Attorney Speech
Critical of the Judiciary
Courts currently use defamation standards to evaluate whether attorney
speech is punishable. Courts have either adopted the New York Times v. Sullivan
actual malice standard, which grants the widest protection to attorney speech, or
they have adopted the objective standard, which generally gives bar disciplinary
committees broad discretion to sanction attorneys.171 However, if we accept the
premise that attorney speech is different because of its professional
underpinnings, then the purposes behind defamation standards fail to address the
professional goals of state or federal bars. Historically, the law of defamation
developed as a way to discourage individuals or family members from turning to
violent vigilantism in order to vindicate their reputations.172 Defamation as a cause
of action also recognized that reputational harm could have “material
consequences, such as pecuniary loss, impairment of social relationships, physical
injury, and mental distress.”173 Besides aspects of honor and dignity that are lost
with a damaged reputation, other scholars view reputation as a property right.174
In its famous 1964 case New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
defined the constitutional standard to protect speech from civil liability.175
Breaking with common law tradition, the Supreme Court ruled that, if a plaintiff is
a public official, he or she must prove actual malice—that the defendant knew the
statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.176 The Court

170. Tarkington, supra note 166, at 10.
171. See supra Part II.
172.
David A. Anderson, Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 877
(1956) [hereinafter Anderson, Developments]; cf. David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and Proof,
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1984) (arguing that historical victims of defamation faced serious social
and economic repercussions).
173. Anderson, Developments, supra note 172, at 877.
174. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution,
74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693–99 (1986).
175. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
176. Id.
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acknowledged that this standard would sometimes prevent public officials from
recovering for false speech but reasoned that “erroneous statement is inevitable in
free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to
have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive.’”177 In Garrison v. State of
Louisiana, the court applied the Sullivan framework to criminal libel statutes.178
Nowhere, however, do the rationales behind the Supreme Court standard of
defamation as a cause of action address issues related to organizational
administration or aspects of conduct, particularly in the professional context. The
law of defamation is designed to redress a private wrong against an individual for
harming a reputation. The rules that restrict attorney speech are not meant to
protect the reputation of judges, but rather to preserve efficient judicial
functioning.179 While preserving the reputation of the judiciary is related to this
goal, the restriction has much more to do with regulating how bar members act as
professionals. Thus, according to Wendel, the Sullivan standard does not directly
deal with the professional goals of the bar, and complicates the adjudication of
cases concerning attorney speech.180
In contrast to Wendel, Professor Tarkington has defended the use of Sullivan
and its progeny in attorney speech cases, arguing that reputational harm is the
main concern behind these restrictions.181 She makes three principal arguments.
One is a semantic argument in which she simply argues that the word “integrity”
in Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2 implies the type of reputational harm
that defamation law is meant to redress.182 Second, she argues that defamation is
not only a private wrong, but also concerns people being able to speak out against
the government and its actors.183 Finally, using Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. as her
main source, Professor Tarkington rebuts arguments that attorney speech should
be restricted because ethical restraints prevent judges from utilizing the media to
express their views.184
What Tarkington misses in her arguments is that attorneys are in a different
position than nonattorneys due to their ability to practice law. Much of what the
attorney does is criticize the judiciary. After all, an appeal means the attorney is
criticizing a lower court action. Thus, attorney speech is much more powerful than
nonattorney speech because attorneys’ words are an extension of their
professional capacity.185 With these words motions are argued, objections are

177. Id. at 271–72.
178. Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
179. Wendel, supra note 125, at 431.
180. Id.
181. Tarkington, supra note 158, at 1629.
182. Id. at 1630–31.
183. Id. at 1631–32.
184. Id. at 1634–36.
185. In distinguishing her views from court opinions that have suggested that defamation law
is wrongly applied, Tarkington cites numerous cases that support the inconsistent goals of defamation
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made, and advice is given. These words are not merely speech in its literal sense,
but professional activity as well. Therefore, when the bar establishes rules that may
restrict certain forms of speech, it does so based on professional goals related to
regulating certain types of professional activity. Nonattorneys may criticize the
courts with impunity, but lawyers do not enjoy the same right because of their
professional affiliation.186 After all, professional groups commonly restrict what
their members may say. Most people would agree that medical associations should
have rules in place to deter physicians from divulging confidential information.187
The same is true for clergy.188 Lawyers should be no different.
The difference between the Tarkington and Wendel approaches seems to
center on whether attorney speech critical of judges should be viewed primarily as
core political speech or as speech with professional underpinnings. The New York
Times v. Sullivan standard is useful when viewing attorney speech as political speech
stemming from personal opinions. However, the professional context changes the
applicability of Sullivan. The point is that some amount of attorney speech is
always related to professional conduct in either a concrete or an attenuated way.
While Sullivan was a profound case because it allowed speakers to make claims
without absolute precision in order to protect speech, the Court did not consider
how it might apply to professional regulations. The Hatch Act, attorneysolicitation, and employer-employee cases discussed above suggest that First
Amendment analysis changes in light of different professional contexts. In those
cases, the Supreme Court chose to use different levels of protection because of
the special professional context of the speech.189 Likewise, the fact that the speech
involved is critical of government actors does not automatically bring that speech
within the usual First Amendment standards. In matters concerning bar
restrictions on speech, the Sullivan standard, although helpful, ultimately does not
address the professional and organizational goals of the bar.
The ultimate difference between defamation law and bar rules is that they
serve competing social purposes. While defamation law usually concerns an
individual plaintiff and provides redress for a defamatory statement, bar rules are

law and professional rules of conduct. Id. at 1631 n.371.
186. Many authors have debated whether restrictions on attorney speech violate a principle of
constitutional law known as the unconstitutional condition doctrine. See e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note
20, at 873. The doctrine states that the government cannot condition a benefit on someone giving up
a right. The Supreme Court has focused on cases where financial subsidies or tax breaks are the
benefit. See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); F.C.C. v. League of Women
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). Regulations on attorneys
that limit what they can or cannot do in the context of professional conduct are distinguishable from
the unconstitutional condition cases because attorneys get no direct financial benefit and do not
completely give up their rights to criticize the judiciary.
187. Jessica A. Hinkie, Free Speech and Rule 3.6: How the Object of Attorney Speech Affects the Right
to Make Public Criticism, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 695, 695 n.2 (2007).
188. Id. at 695 n.3.
189. See supra Part III.A–C.
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meant to protect a larger set of social interests. For instance, the State Bar of
California states that one of its goals is “[t]o assure that the State Bar is recognized
and respected as a contributing and accountable leader in improving the
administration of justice and ensuring the rule of law in our civil society.”190 If bar
rules are meant to achieve the goal of preserving justice and maintaining civil
order in society, then defamation law does not squarely address these broader
functional goals. The Indiana Supreme Court noted that, although sanctioning
critical attorney speech “may directly affect an individual, [it] is not punished for
the benefit of the affected person; the wrong is against society as a whole, the
preservation of a fair, impartial judicial system, and the system of justice as it has
evolved for generations.”191 If this is so, it is doubtful whether the Sullivan
standard truly addresses the professional context.
This does not mean that defamation law is entirely inapplicable to these lines
of cases. A judge is free to sue an attorney for libelous and slanderous
statements,192 but the government cannot.193 Thus, a bar disciplinary committee,
as a representative of the federal or state judiciary, cannot sue an individual for
reputational harm. But as discussed above, bar punishments are not entirely meant
to insulate judges from criticism. Instead, they have a professional regulatory
purpose. Because I conclude that defamation, as a legal cause of action, is not the
core matter in cases where attorneys are punished for criticizing judges, I suggest
that courts adopt a test that balances the professional and public interests of the
speech.
VI. THE BALANCING TEST EXPLAINED: THREE FACTORS THAT BALANCE
PROFESSIONAL AND PUBLIC INTERESTS
I argue that Sullivan and its progeny do not directly address the public and
professional interests of attorney speech critical of judges or the judiciary as a
whole. In their attempts to set definitive standards for the speech, courts have
either selected the subjective Sullivan standard or the objective standard for
evaluating attorney speech critical of judges. However, these standards have failed
to confront the underlying policy question of whether it is desirable to restrict
attorney speech critical of judges; instead they have created disunity among the
courts.194 I propose a standard that would balance the professional and public
interests in order to determine whether attorney speech critical of judges should
190.
State Bar Overview, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://calbar.ca.gov/aboutus
/statebaroverview.aspx (last visited Jul. 10, 2011).
191. In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979).
192.
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348–49 (1946) (“[A] judge has such remedy in
damages for libel as do other public servants.”); see also Illinois Chief Justice Settles Defamation Suit Against
Newspaper for $3M, LAW.COM (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005557872.
193.
RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 3 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM
OF SPEECH § 23:3.50 (3d ed. 2011).
194. See supra Part II.
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be sanctioned.
This type of balancing among professional, public, and individual interests
was used in Ramsey v. Board of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee.195
The Court wrote:
In dealing with First Amendment questions, we must balance the right of
the speaker to communicate and the right of the listener to receive his
expressions with the need of the courts to enforce attorney discipline to
the end that a lawyer will not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice . . . . There is thus a delicate balance between a
lawyer’s right to speak, the right of the public and the press to have
access to information, and the need of the bench and Bar to insure that
the administration of justice is not prejudiced by a lawyer’s remarks. In
balancing these rights, we must ensure that lawyer discipline . . . does not
create a chilling effect on First Amendment rights.196
This approach employed a three-part balancing test that weighs (1) the public
value of the speech, such as informing the public, pointing out abuses of the law,
or providing defense to a client or cause; (2) the degree of reputational and
administrative damage to a court, either affecting the efficacy of its rulings or its
ability to carry out its judicial functions; and (3) the extent to which the speech
was connected to the attorney’s professional duty as opposed to his private
interests.197
As with any balancing test, this test has some drawbacks. Because balancing
tests require an uncertain weighing of factors, they are less predictable than
categorical rules. The most problematic issue with the balancing test is that it does
not provide concrete guidelines to attorneys, creating the possibility that it will
have a chilling effect on the attorney’s willingness to speak. It would be difficult
for an attorney to do his or her own balancing to ascertain whether the critical
speech will be sanctioned or not. In contrast, the Sullivan standard provides the
most clarity to lawyers because it protects speech as long as there is no subjective
malice, putting the burden of proof on the plaintiff alleging defamation.198
However, the subjective standard would put too much burden on the bar to
effectively regulate professional conduct. The objective standard is probably the
least desirable. It might chill attorneys from speaking because it would be difficult
to determine what the court might decide that the “reasonable” attorney would
say. The balancing test is a better framework because it incorporates the
professional and public interests involved.

195.
196.
197.
198.

771 S.W.2d 116 (Tenn. 1989).
Id. at 121.
Id.
Tarkington, supra note 20, at 433–34.
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A. The Balancing Test Applied
A good example of where this balancing test would be useful today is a
situation where an attorney criticizes a court or a judge on a personal social media
website. Using the case Florida Bar v. Conway, described above in Part I as an
example, an application of the balancing test can show how the case could have
been more equitably resolved.
1. Factor One: The Public Value of the Speech
The first factor of the balancing test evaluates the public value of the speech.
The subject matter and context of Conway’s criticism had high social value
because it informed the public of judicial actions that affected how constitutional
protections were handled in the Florida court. Conway’s speech directly
commented on two important public issues: a defendant’s right to a speedy trial
and the competency of a judge. The first issue concerned whether the judge’s
action violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. As Conway highlighted in
his response letter to the Florida Bar, Rule 3.160 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure gives defendants who plead not guilty a “reasonable time to prepare for
trial.”199 Judge Aleman interpreted this rule by giving defendants just one week to
prepare for trial. Judge Aleman’s policy put large burdens on defense counsel,
including Conway, to prepare for trial and also pressured defendants to waive their
Sixth Amendment right. Conway’s criticism of Judge Aleman was closely related
to her policy, which affected defendants’ constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the fact that Judge Aleman was an elected member of the
judiciary held accountable to voters made Conway’s speech more valuable to the
public interest. In jurisdictions where voters have the power to elect judges, they
should be entitled to information that may affect how they vote. Unlike legislative
or executive candidates, judicial candidates are more constrained about what they
can reveal in political discourse. Because lawyers have legal education and
experience, they are better able to evaluate whether a judge is competent. This
puts attorneys in the best position to provide information to the voting public.
Thus, if voters are able to distinguish bad judges from good and elect the latter,
this would increase the quality of the judiciary as a whole.
Another point relevant to this factor is whether there is a distinction between
speech directed at elected judges versus appointed judges. The balancing test is
somewhat flawed when determining whether speech about an elected judge is
more valuable than speech about a federally appointed judge. Although people can
attempt to remove a federal judge by lobbying Congress to exercise that power,
the balancing test would seem to suggest that speech directed at elected judges is
more valuable. This is mainly because elected judges more closely resemble

199.

FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.160.

Assembled V1I4 3.28.2012 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

4/6/2012 4:04 PM

ATTORNEY SPEECH CRITICAL OF THE JUDICIARY

1251

political figures, in addition to being accountable to the voting public. There is no
doubt that this would create inequities because federal court judges, who are
arguably just as prone to error as their state court counterparts, would receive
more protection from the balancing test. Courts would use the test to evaluate the
importance of the speech based on the context of the situation. One of those
contexts happens to be elections. The elected versus appointed distinction does
not seriously change the analysis of the balancing, but speech about elected judges
seems to be more connected to the policy interest of having an informed public
because the elected judge is directly accountable to voters.
In this situation, Conway had argued before Judge Aleman, giving him
firsthand knowledge about Judge Aleman’s application of the law and judicial
discretion.200 By contrast, nonattorneys lack the legal education and training to
fully understand the nature and effect of the judicial action, which makes it
imperative for attorneys like Conway to express their thoughts to the public. By
writing on a blog about Judge Aleman’s “one-week policy,” Conway relayed
information that would be relevant to voters when deciding whether to reelect
her. The weakness of this rationale is that it may insulate federal judges more than
state judges, the majority of whom are elected. One function of the balancing test
is to promote speech that has redeeming value. The balancing test is meant to
encourage meritorious speech and only protects vulgarities if the general value of
the speech is high. Ideally all attorney speech critical of the judiciary should be
meritorious, but federal judges perhaps should be able to withstand more
nonmeritorious critical speech because they are not directly accountable to the
public.
Conway’s speech was also valuable because it warned attorneys in the
community about Judge Aleman’s actions. Conway did not know how long Judge
Aleman would be instituting this practice, and could reasonably have thought that
other attorneys would have to confront it in the future. By reading the blog entry,
lawyers could better prepare for an encounter with Judge Aleman and perhaps be
able to try a case with tighter time constraints without having to waive a
defendant’s right to a speedy trial. In fact, Conway even provided tactical advice to
attorneys, informing them of ways to object to Judge Aleman’s tactics using
Florida criminal procedure.201
An issue that did not occur in Conway’s situation but often occurs in matters
concerning judicial criticism is how to account for speech that is objectively false.
Conway’s speech was clearly stated as an opinion, but what if he had made

200. Respondent Sean William Conway’s Response to this Court’s Rule to Show Cause Order
at 2, Florida Bar v. Conway, No. SC08-326 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://jaablog.jaablaw
.com/files/34726-32374/conway_response.pdf.
201.
Letter from Sean Conway to Alan Anthony Pascal, Bar Counsel to the Florida Bar,
attachment 2 (Apr. 17, 2007), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files
/2007-04-03-letter%20notifying%20conway%20of%20bar%20investigation.pdf.
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accusations against Judge Aleman that could be proved false? False speech has less
public value because it impairs the public’s decision-making process during
elections and needlessly damages the image of the judiciary. The Supreme Court in
Sullivan recognized that erroneous statements are inevitable in public debate and
should therefore be protected to a certain degree,202 but in Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co. the Court also ruled that opinions are not protected if they infer facts
capable of being proven false.203 Whether a statement is opinion or fact can
sometimes be a gray area, but this determination is largely irrelevant to this
balancing analysis. The balancing test is mainly concerned with whether the
speech adds to the public interest. Factually false statements and even true
statements with some incorrect facts are obviously less valuable than completely
true statements. Unlike defamation law, which would grant the speaker First
Amendment protections based on the Milkovich standard, the balancing test is
concerned with the value to the public, including the factual correctness of the
statement. Thus, the opinion determination is not dispositive but would be
evaluated as part of the public interest analysis.
In this matter, Conway’s criticism clearly has high value to the public in
terms of informing it of the shortcomings of Judge Aleman’s actions.
2. Factor Two: The Degree of Damage to the Court
The second factor of the balancing test evaluates how much institutional
damage the court suffers from the speech. Under the balancing test, the bar or
disciplinary committee arguing for attorney sanctions would have the onerous task
of proving damage to the courts. Empirical evidence through statistics would be
the easiest to meet this factor, but the bar can also use indirect showings, such as
highlighting reputational damage, the character of the verbal attack, increased acts
of disobedience against the court from attorneys inside or outside the courtroom,
or general notions of how the bar’s administrative efficacy has been diminished.
The goals of the bar should be recognized as an important interest, but the bar
must be required to demonstrate that the institutional integrity and administration
of the judiciary has been compromised to some extent. Therefore, this factor’s
weight depends on the amount of direct or circumstantial evidence of damage the
bar offers to the court.
The Florida court did present some evidence of damage to its institutional
efficacy as a result of Conway’s statements. Judges are vested with large amounts
of discretion, in part to ensure the successful functioning of the court. Conway’s
blog entry criticizing Judge Aleman’s judicial practice of providing a short period
of time for attorneys to prepare for trial was an assault on her policies of judicial
economy. If attorneys who read the entry started objecting to the judge’s rulings

202.
203.

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272–73 (1964).
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
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using the procedural tactics recommended by Conway, it might have created
undue pressure on Aleman to unnecessarily change her policy. Furthermore,
Conway’s blog entry called Judge Aleman’s professional character into question,
thereby affecting how the public views the judiciary. The blog post may have
caused lawyers to increase unnecessary objections or motions causing unnecessary
delays in the judicial process. Conway’s criticism of Judge Aleman’s discretion may
have led to public doubt about court rulings in general. The fact that Conway
called Judge Aleman an “Evil, Unfair Witch” also indicates that he intended the
speech to be somewhat malicious.
The weight of this factor is in middling favor to the bar because it appears
that the court suffered little organizational damage or damage to its integrity. The
speech had very little if any actual effect on the judiciary. Only Judge Aleman was
singled out in the criticism and not the entire court. Moreover, the criticism was
not an allegation of corruption, but a criticism about the way the court was
applying a court rule.204 Thus, the speech was pertinent to judicial administration
itself. Furthermore, the context of the speech limited its possible damaging effect.
Since the comment was made around Halloween, it is likely that most people who
read the blog understood the hyperbolic nature of calling Judge Aleman a witch.
Judge Aleman abandoned her policy of providing minimal time for defense
attorneys to prepare for trial only a few weeks after Conway’s statements.205
Altering how a judge manages his or her courtroom is the type of administrative
disturbance that bars generally seek to avoid. However, judges have wide
discretionary powers and attorneys should not be punished just because their
speech persuades a judge to change course. The Florida Bar, in its brief to the
Florida Supreme Court, did not argue that Conway’s speech weakened the
functionality or efficacy of the court.206 In sum, the relative lack of tangible
evidence suggesting that Conway’s criticism compromised the court’s integrity and
administrative capabilities shows this factor of the balancing test weighs only
slightly in favor of the bar.
3. Factor Three: The Connection Between the Speech and the Attorney’s Professional Duties
The third factor of the balancing test takes into account where the speech
was produced. The main question under this factor is whether Conway’s speech
was private or professional speech. In this case, the speech was not in the
courtroom but on the Internet. However, it was made before Conway’s client
went to trial. This factor in particular weighs in favor of Conway because Judge
Aleman was an elected official, making her inherently more prone to criticism.

204. Letter from Alan Anthony Pascal to Sean Conway, supra note 7.
205. Letter from Sean Conway to Alan Anthony Pascal, supra note 201.
206. Response to Rule to Show Cause at 5–14, Florida Bar v. Conway, No. SC08–326 (Fla.
Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://jaablog.jaablaw.com/files/34726-32374/Response_Bar[1].pdf.
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While the “Evil, Unfair Witch” label may have been caustic, it was made on
Halloween, so readers probably understood it as a form of rhetorical hyperbole.
Furthermore, the fact that Conway’s criticism was written on a blog reduces
the professional impact of the speech.207 Although millions of blogs now exist and
are of growing importance, they are still viewed as limited sources of information.
Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds of the University of Tennessee School of Law,
who has one of the most widely read blogs in America, believes that most people
do not rely on blogs as a sole source of information, but merely as a jumping-off
point.208 Attorney speech should not be excused because it is on a blog, but it
should be less prone to punishment because blog entries are out-of-court
statements made on an informal mode of communication. Professor Reynolds
contends that “courts should recognize that the blogosphere is a place with its
own culture, norms, and readership.”209 Attorney speech critical of the judiciary
that is displayed on social media sites warrants more leeway because readers will
perceive it to be closer to private speech than professional speech.210
Courts should be more cognizant of the type of media that attorneys choose
when speaking. Critical speech that is in a court motion should be more
scrutinized than something written on a website that has only an attenuated
connection to professional conduct. Therefore, the fact that Conway posted his
remark on a blog should limit the extent to which the rules of professional
conduct can govern his speech.
It should also be noted that the size of the audience does not factor highly
into the analysis. The main purpose of this prong is to determine the extent to
which the bar may restrict attorney speech when it does not occur inside the
courtroom. Whether the audience is large or not may give more effect to the
speech, but it should not determine whether the bar should sanction attorney
speech.

207.
See, e.g., Lindsay A. Hitz, Protecting Blogging: The Need for an Actual Disruption Standard in
Pickering, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1151 (2010) (arguing that public employees who post entries on
blogs about work-related activity should only be punished if the speech caused actual disruption in
the workplace); see also Marcia Clemmitt, Internet Accuracy: The Issues, CQ RESEARCHER 627 (Aug. 1,
2008), http://www.cqpress.com/docs/cq_researcher_v18-27_internet_accuracy.pdf.
208. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1157, 1166 (2006).
209. Id. at 1167.
210.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has recognized that Internet-based social media
has implications on disciplinary enforcement rules and client confidentiality. A part of the ABA’s
Commission on Ethics 20/20 will be devoted to this issue. For an outline, see ABA Comm. on Ethics
20/20, Preliminary Issues Outline (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/migrated/ethics2020/outline.authcheckdam.pdf.
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B. The Balancing of the Factors
Because the public interest of the speech is high, relative to its potential
negative effect on the judiciary, Conway should not have been sanctioned for his
remarks under the balancing test. This situation is extraordinary in that his speech
carried significantly more social value than most instances of attorney criticism. It
brought to light a judge’s policy that could greatly affect the due process rights of
criminal defendants. It also made the public more aware about how this elected
judge treated criminal defendants in court. The Florida Judicial Qualifications
Commission and the Florida Supreme Court eventually took notice of Judge
Aleman and reprimanded her for, among other things, forcing a public defender in
a death penalty case to craft a motion in a few minutes or face contempt
charges.211 In the Conway case, the bar was not able to proffer evidence that its
integrity was harmed, or that its organizational goals were compromised.
Furthermore, since Conway’s speech was posted on a blog, although a legal one
frequented by local attorneys, the speech was more private than professional.
Thus, the balancing would favor Conway.
The most decisive factor in the test seems to be the first. The bar’s interests,
which are covered by factor two, will focus mainly on organizational integrity and
administration in every case. The key question then becomes the importance of
the speech to the public. The balancing of the factors also changes depending on
whether the judge is an elected state judge or a life-appointed federal judge.
Attorney speech is more useful to the public’s democratic interest when the judge
is directly elected by the public. What distinguishes this test from the defamation
standards is that it allows for more flexibility in evaluating the particular speech
involved. While the subjective actual malice test may not fully recognize the bar’s
or court’s regulatory interests, the objective standard gives a blank check to
disciplinary committees and appellate courts to impose sanctions. The balancing
test establishes a middle ground between these two extremes and also gives more
protection to attorneys. The balancing test is a more desirable standard that
considers the interests of the bar or the court, the attorneys, and the public.
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts and bars, legally and traditionally, can regulate the speech of attorneys
by limiting lawyers’ right to criticize the judiciary. Accepting this assertion, the
next question is how attorney speech critical of the judiciary should be judged.
Traditionally, courts have looked to defamation law to evaluate the speech.
However, defamation standards do not address the rationales for allowing courts
and state bars to regulate speech. Instead, courts should adopt a balancing test that

211.
See Aleman Reprimanded for “Unsettling” Use of Power, FLORIDA BAR NEWS (Jan. 1, 2008),
http://www.floridaBar.org/divcom/jn/jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/1a0f096cd
022cbea852574e9004a9527.
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addresses the interests of the public, the judiciary, and the attorney. Balancing
these factors will allow courts greater flexibility and provide a steady framework
for courts to evaluate attorney speech critical of judges or the judiciary.

